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ABSTRACT
	 The	 NASA	 Dryden	 Flight	 Research	 Center	 flew	 two	 Hyper-X	 research	 vehicles	 and	
achieved	hypersonic	speeds	over	the	Pacific	Ocean	in	March	and	November	2004.	To	train	the	flight	
and	mission	control	room	crew,	the	NASA	Dryden	simulation	capability	was	utilized	to	generate	
telemetry	and	radar	data,	which	was	used	in	nominal	and	emergency	mission	scenarios.	During	
these	control	room	training	sessions	personnel	were	able	to	evaluate	and	refine	data	displays,	flight	
cards,	mission	parameter	allowable	 limits,	and	emergency	procedure	checklists.	Practice	 in	 the	
mission	control	room	ensured	that	all	primary	and	backup	Hyper-X	staff	were	familiar	with	the	
nominal	mission	and	knew	how	to	respond	to	anomalous	conditions	quickly	and	successfully.	This	
report	describes	the	technology	in	the	simulation	environment	and	the	Mission	Control	Center,	the	
need	for	and	benefit	of	control	room	training,	and	the	rationale	and	results	of	specific	scenarios	
unique	to	the	Hyper-X	research	missions.
NOMENCLATURE
AFB	 	 Air	Force	Base
AIP	 	 initial	point
ALCH		 launch	point
APWR		 power	transfer	point
AREV		 reverse	point
BIT	 	 built-in-test
CVT	 	 current-value	table
DECOM	 decommutator
DFRC	 	 Dryden	Flight	Research	Center
EAFB	 	 Edwards	Air	Force	Base
EDW	 	 Edwards
EP	 	 emergency	procedure
FMU	 	 flight	management	unit
FTS	 	 flight	termination	system
GMN	 	 Gorman
GRIM	 	 Global	Real-Time	Interactive	Map
GVO	 	 Gaviota
g		 	 gravitational	unit
HDOT		 altitude	rate
HXLV		 Hyper-X	launch	vehicle
HXRV		 Hyper-X	research	vehicle
INALT		 inertial	altitude
2LaRC	 	 Langley	Research	Center
LBITOR	 health	summary	bit
MCC	 	 Mission	Control	Center
NAS	 	 Naval	Air	Station
NASA		 National	Aeronautics	and	Space	Administration
NAWC-WD	 Naval	Air	Warfare	Center	Weapons	Division
NZF	 	 vertical	acceleration,	filtered
NZUF	 	 vertical	acceleration,	unfiltered
N
z
	 	 vertical	acceleration
PAGE	 	 Project	Application	Graphics	Executable
PCM	 	 pulse-coded	modulation
PDS	 	 Parameter	Display	System
SIM3DApp	 an	in-house	software	application
TIE	 	 Test	Information	Engineer
TRAPS	 Telemetry/Radar	Acquisition	Processing	System
WATR		 Western	Aeronautical	Test	Range
WINGS	 WATR	Integrated	Next	Generation	System
INTRODUCTION
	 The	 Hyper-X	 program	 was	 an	 experimental	 flight	 research	 program	 intended	 to	
demonstrate	 advanced	hypersonic	 technologies	 (ref.	 1).	The	primary	 research	objective	was	 to	
flight-test	an	airframe-integrated	scramjet,	which	could	pave	the	way	for	high-speed	aircraft	and	
the	 next	 generation	 of	 reusable	 launch	 vehicles.	The	NASA	Langley	Research	Center	 (LaRC,	
Hampton,	Virginia)	was	the	Hyper-X	program	lead,	and	the	NASA	Dryden	Flight	Research	Center	
(DFRC,	Edwards,	California)	led	the	flight-test	effort.	Three	Hyper-X	research	vehicles	(HXRVs),	
collectively	known	as	X-43A,	were	built	for	the	Hyper-X	program.	All	three	vehicles	were	virtually	
identical;	the	main	difference	among	them	was	the	internal	scramjet	engine	flowpaths.	The	first	
vehicle	was	intended	to	be	flown	to	a	speed	of	Mach	7	on	June	2,	2001.	It	was	destroyed	along	
with	its	Pegasus®	(Orbital	Sciences	Corporation,	Dulles,	Virginia)	booster	rocket	approximately	
48	 s	 after	 launch	 because	 of	 a	 loss	 of	 control	 of	 the	 booster	 (ref.	 2).	The	 second	 vehicle	was	
successfully	flown	to	a	speed	of	Mach	6.8	on	March	27,	2004,	and	effectively	demonstrated	the	in-
flight	operation	of	its	scramjet.	All	of	the	goals	for	that	mission,	including	positive	acceleration	of	
the	vehicle	by	the	scramjet,	were	achieved.	The	third	and	final	mission	of	the	program	was	flown	
to	a	speed	of	Mach	9.7	on	November	16,	2004,	again	successfully	demonstrating	positive	engine	
acceleration.
Control	room	training	was	an	essential	part	of	the	preparation	for	all	three	Hyper-X	missions.	
Previous	work	for	flight	1	is	described	in	ref.	3.	The	state	of	the	art	for	the	2001	first	flight	was	
further	 improved	 in	 the	 interim	period	 before	 the	 2004	flight	 2	mission.	This	 report	 describes	
3the	control	room	training	necessity,	technological	capability,	and	implementation	philosophy	for	
X-43A	flights	2	and	3.
HYPER-X PROGRAM DESCRIPTION AND TRAINING NEED
The	HXRV	was	an	unmanned	vehicle	that	measured	approximately	12	ft	long	by	5	ft	wide,	
and	weighed	approximately	3,000	lb.	A	modified	Pegasus®	rocket	booster	known	as	the	Hyper-X	
Launch	Vehicle	(HXLV),	developed	by	Orbital	Sciences	Corporation	of	Chandler,	Arizona,	carried	
the	X-43A	to	the	test	condition.	The	HXRV	was	mounted	to	the	nose	of	the	HXLV	and	the	mated	
HXLV–HXRV	stack	was	carried	to	the	launch	point	under	the	wing	of	the	NASA	B-52	airplane,	
tail	 number	 008.	After	 the	B-52	 airplane	 took	 off	 from	Edwards	Air	 Force	Base	 (EAFB),	 the	
stack	was	carried	over	the	Pacific	Ocean	to	an	altitude	of	approximately	40	000	ft	and	a	speed	of	
Mach	0.8.	It	was	then	released	from	the	B-52	airplane,	heading	due	west.	A	few	seconds	after	drop,	
the	HXLV	 rocket	motor	 ignited,	 propelling	 the	 stack	 to	 a	 separation	 altitude	of	 approximately	
110	000	ft.	After	the	HXRV	separated	from	the	HXLV,	the	engine	cowl	door	on	the	HXRV	opened,	
enabling	engine	ignition	and	operation	for	approximately	10	s.	After	engine	shutdown,	the	cowl	
door	was	closed,	and	an	unpowered	descent	trajectory	was	flown	to	a	splashdown	in	the	Pacific	
Ocean.	This	flight	trajectory	is	depicted	visually	in	fig.	1.
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Figure	1.	The	X-43A	flight	trajectory.
The	B-52	airplane,	with	 the	stack	mated	under	 its	 right	wing,	 took	off	 from	EAFB	in	 the	
Western	Aeronautical	Test	Range	(WATR)	of	DFRC,	with	a	transition	to	the	Naval	Air	Warfare	
Center	Weapons	Division	(NAWC-WD)	Sea	Range	for	the	drop,	boost,	experiment,	descent,	and	
splashdown	portions	of	the	mission.	The	entire	mission	following	the	drop	from	the	B-52	airplane	
was	carried	out	autonomously,	and	the	HXRV	was	not	recovered	after	splashdown.	The	expected	
flightpath	over	 the	NAWC-WD	Sea	Range	was	calculated	so	 that	any	potential	mission	debris	
	
4would	 land	 in	 designated	 weapons	 testing	 zones,	 which	 are	 free	 of	 boat	 traffic	 during	
NAWC-WD	missions.
In	order	to	launch	the	vehicle	in	the	calculated	hazard	zones,	the	stack	had	to	be	dropped	from	
the	B-52	airplane	precisely	within	a	3-min	launch	window	while	the	B-52	airplane	was	flying	at	
a	speed	of	Mach	0.8.	To	meet	this	launch	objective,	waypoints	along	the	B-52	ground	track	from	
EAFB	were	defined.	Mission	planners	from	the	DFRC	Operations	Engineering	branch	carefully	
defined	activities	during	 the	45-min	captive-carry	flight	 to	 the	 launch	point	 so	 that	all	 in-flight	
vehicle	preparations	would	take	place	on	a	timed	schedule.	These	waypoints	and	the	B-52	ground	
track	are	outlined	in	fig.	2.	The	B-52	airplane	both	originated	and	ended	its	flight	at	EAFB	(noted	
by	the	EDW	waypoint).	Table	1	describes	the	activities	onboard	the	B-52	airplane	along	the	B-52	
flight	profile.	The	entire	research	mission	was	controlled	and	monitored	by	the	flight	research	team	
in	the	DFRC	Mission	Control	Center	(MCC).
Figure	2.		The	B-52	ground	track	and	waypoints	prior	to	HXRV	launch.
5Table	1.	The	B-52	flight	profile	description	and	personnel	responsibilities.
Waypoint
Mission	time	
(hh:mm)
Functions	performed	before	next	waypoint
t# Label Description
1 EDW B-52	take-off	
from	EAFB
00:25 B-52	pilot	performs	phasing	maneuvers
2 GMN Landmark 00:35 Transition	from	WATR	assets	to	NAWC-WD	
Range	assets
3 GVO Last	over-land	
point
00:44 HXLV	FTS	power	on	
HXRV	power	on,	built-in-test,	and	power	off
4 APWR Power	transfer	
point
00:56 HXLV	FTS	power	transfer	
HXRV	system	checks
5 ALCH Launch	point	
(in	reverse)
01:04 Steady	flight	for	HXLV	engineers	to	monitor	
weather	conditions	in	the	launch	box
HXLV	FTS	tone	checks
6 AREV Reverse	point 01:14 HXRV	system	checks
7 AIP Initial	point 01:20
(L-9)
Final	B-52	speed	and	altitude	adjustments	to	
achieve	optimal	HXLV	launch	condition
HXRV	system	condition	verification
HXRV	and	HXLV	transfer	to	internal	power
HXRV	built-in	test
Safety	hooks	and	pins	removed
HXLV	fin	actuation	system	power	up	and		
built-in	test
HXRV	valves	uninhibited
HXRV	adapter	cameras	on
8 ALCH Launch	point 01:29 B-52	pilot	launches	the	HXLV	on	cue	from	
DFRC	MCC
Monitor	stations	onboard	B-52	airplane	powered	
down
9 GVO Over-land	point 01:42 Release	NAWC-WD	assets	and	return	to	WATR	
assets
10 GMN Landmark		
(in	reverse)
01:51
11 EDW Landing	at	
EAFB
01:58 Post-launch	task	list
6	 As	 seen	 in	 table	 1,	 the	majority	 of	 the	 systems	 checks	 and	maneuvers	 occurred	 in	 the	
	launch-minus-9-minute	(L-9-min)	window	between	the	initial	point	(AIP)	and	the	launch	point	
(ALCH).	These	 actions	 included	 final	B-52	 heading,	 altitude,	 and	 speed	 correction	 directives;	
research	vehicle	 internal	battery,	pressurized	fuel	system,	and	flight	computer	navigation-mode	
enabling;	and	launch	vehicle	battery	squib,	fin-pin,	and	fin-sweep	activation.	Operators	onboard	the	
B-52	airplane	performed	these	tasks,	based	on	direction	from	the	DFRC	mission	controller.	Located	
in	the	DFRC	MCC,	the	DFRC	mission	controller	received	inputs	from	the	HXRV	and	HXLV	chief	
engineers,	who	were	receiving	information	from	the	research	engineers	monitoring	the	telemetered	
downlink	data.	For	all	waypoints,	and	for	the	last	L-9-min	period	in	particular,	these	actions	had	
to	be	carefully	executed	in	order	and	on	time,	so	that	the	B-52	airplane	arrived	on	condition	at	the	
designed	launch	box.	Preflight	operations	for	an	X-43A	mission	took	approximately	seven	days	to	
complete	(with	some	personnel	staffing	24-hour	shifts),	so	there	existed	a	substantial	incentive	to	
safely	and	successfully	launch	on	the	first	attempt.	A	successful	first-attempt	launch	required	the	
near-perfect	execution	of	tasks	during	the	B-52	flight	profile.	For	this	reason,	extensive	control	
room	training	was	conducted	to	ensure	the	operator,	the	controller,	and	the	engineer	familiarity	
with	the	execution	of	their	tasks.
	 During	the	B-52	flight	to	ALCH,	control	room	engineers	were	expected	to	monitor	vehicle	
health	and	status,	reporting	to	the	chief	engineer	that	the	systems	were	either	on	condition	or	that	
there	was	 an	 anomaly.	The	project	 personnel	 defined	 a	go/no-go	 list	 of	 parameters	 and	values	
by	which	decisions	to	proceed	to	launch	were	made.	Hyper-X	Mission	Control	could	not	afford	
to	launch	this	one-of-a-kind	vehicle	if	any	system	was	malfunctioning;	conversely,	each	launch	
attempt	cost	approximately	$500,000,	so	there	was	incentive	not	to	return	to	EAFB	unnecessarily.	
Control	 room	 training	 is	 essential	 to	 ensure	 that	 everyone	has	 internalized	 their	 portion	of	 the	
go/no-go	parameter	set.	There	were	personnel	changes	between	each	of	 the	X-43A	flights,	and	
nearly	a	three-year	downtime	between	flight	1	and	flight	2,	so	training	was	needed	to	keep	everyone	
proficient	at	their	role.	In	addition,	each	station	had	a	primary	and	a	backup	person,	so	control	room	
training	was	required	to	ensure	that	both	potential	participants	were	comfortable	in	their	role.
	 Emergency	procedure	(EP)	checklists	were	on	hand	in	case	project	engineers	noticed	any	
of	the	possible	flight	hazards	during	the	prelaunch	phase	of	the	B-52	flight	profile.	Some	of	the	
high	risks	during	the	B-52	flight	included	potential	leaks	in	the	HXRV	fuel	system,	a	fire	in	either	
the	 onboard	HXRV	 silane	 system	 or	 the	HXLV,	 and	 high	wing	 loading	 on	 the	B-52	 airplane.	
Responses	to	these	types	of	emergencies	ranged	from	venting	the	HXRV	fuel	system	or	jettisoning	
the	 entire	 stack,	 to	 slowing	 the	 B-52	 airplane	 to	 reduce	 wing	 loading.	As	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	
go/no-go	parameter	set,	execution	of	 the	emergency	procedures	had	 to	be	well-thought-out	but	
initiated	 quickly,	 because	 of	 the	 risk	 to	 the	flight	 crew,	 population	 centers	 on	 the	 ground,	 and	
mission	 hardware.	Control	 room	 training	 is	 essential	 to	 ensuring	 crew	 familiarity	with	 hazard	
conditions	and	the	execution	of	EP	response	checklists.
	 Training	was	also	performed	in	a	captive-carry	mission,	in	which	the	B-52	airplane	flies	
the	 expected	 profile	with	 the	HXRV	 and	HXLV	 in	 a	mated	 but	 not	 live	 condition.	A	 captive-
carry	mission	was	performed	prior	to	each	of	the	three	X-43A	missions.	This	is,	however,	costly	
because	 of	 the	WATR	 and	NAWC-WD	 range	 assets	 [telemetry,	 radar,	 voice	 communications,	
flight	termination	system	(FTS),	and	video	systems]	that	must	be	scheduled	to	support	the	flight.	
7Captive-carry	missions	are	also	high-risk,	because	flight	hardware	is	being	exposed	to	potential	
damage,	and	the	B-52	airplane	is	being	stressed	by	carrying	the	weight	of	the	stack.	It	is	not	practical	
to	perform	multiple	captive-carry	missions.	For	this	reason,	a	simulated	training	environment	was	
required	 to	prepare	X-43A	operators,	controllers,	and	engineers	 for	 the	successful	execution	of	
mission	tasks.
	 Using	 the	 X-43A	 simulation	 equipment,	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 generate	 a	 pulse-coded	
modulation	(PCM)	telemetry	stream	that	exactly	simulated	 the	downlink	 telemetry	stream,	and	
send	it	to	the	MCC	for	display	to	end	users.	In	this	manner,	the	entire	B-52	flight	could	be	practiced,	
with	simulated	parameter	values,	so	that	participants	could	learn	what	to	expect	during	a	nominal	
flightpath.	The	simulated	PCM	stream	also	allowed	for	the	injection	of	parameter	failures,	so	that	
the	X-43A	team	could	practice	executing	EPs.	For	control	room	training	exercises,	an	extra	person	
was	used	in	the	MCC.	This	training	conductor	was	tuned	in	to	the	voice	communications	links	
between	the	mission	controller	and	the	B-52	operators,	so	that	he	could	hear	when	commands	had	
been	issued	or	steps	had	been	executed.	The	training	conductor	would	then	relay	that	command	to	
the	simulation	engineer,	so	that	the	appropriate	activity	could	be	simulated	in	the	parameter	values	
in	the	PCM	stream.
SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
	 The	NASA	Dryden	Flight	Research	Center	Research	Aircraft	Integration	Facility	(RAIF)	
and	 its	 simulation	 capabilities	 support	 the	 most	 advanced	 flight	 research	 projects	 through	 all	
phases	of	vehicle	design,	development,	systems	integration,	verification,	validation,	and	flight-test.	
A	total	of	nine	simulation	labs	offer	data	and	communication	interfaces	to	the	aircraft	test	bays	to	
accomplish	combined	systems	testing.	Data	and	communication	interfaces	are	also	provided	to	the	
Dryden	MCC	supporting	combined	system	testing,	control	room	training,	and	mission	planning.
	 The	NASA	Dryden	HXRV	 simulation	was	 primarily	 developed	 to	 support	 verification	
and	validation	(V&V)	of	the	Hyper-X	avionics.	The	HXRV	simulation	is	a	complex	six-degree-
of-freedom	(6-DOF)	simulation	including	models	for	aerodynamics,	engine,	control	system,	and	
actuators.	Modifications	were	made	to	the	simulation	to	support	control	room	training	by	flying	a	
predefined	B-52	flight	profile.
When	the	simulation	is	used	for	control	room	training,	the	following	physical	equipment	is	
utilized	(see	fig.	3).
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Figure	3.	The	HXRV	simulation	data	flow	for	control	room	training	purposes.
For	 the	Hyper-X	missions,	 three	 PCM	downlink	 streams	were	 simulated	 (HXRV,	HXLV,	
and	B-52	airplane).	To	simulate	these	streams	of	data,	a	VERSAmodule	Eurocard	(VME)	chassis	
containing	three	PCM	simulator–encoder	cards	was	added	to	the	simulation	configuration.
	
Data	 from	the	simulation	are	 transferred	 to	 the	VME	chassis	 through	a	 replicated	shared-
memory	 interface.	 This	 interface	 provides	 for	 the	 sharing	 of	 information	 between	 different	
operating	systems	and	hardware	platforms.	The	simulated	PCM	data	consists	of	approximately	
700	 parameters	 (out	 of	 a	 total	 of	 approximately	 2100	 for	 the	 three	 Hyper-X	 PCM	 streams).	
Parameters	not	actively	modeled	in	the	simulation	were	simply	assigned	nominal	values	which	
they	retained	unless	perturbed	by	an	EP	scenario.	A	problem	to	be	faced	in	simulating	PCM	data	
is	the	requirement	to	convert	the	desired	engineering	unit	output	to	counts.	For	linear	calibrations,	
an	inverse	calibration	can	be	directly	obtained.	For	higher	order	calibrations,	the	Newton-Raphson	
method	is	used	to	numerically	invert	the	polynomial.	This	technique	is	described	in	ref.	4.	
In	addition	to	the	PCM	downlink	data,	the	position	of	the	B-52	airplane	is	tracked	by	the	WATR	
radar.	To	simulate	this	data	stream,	the	simulation	used	one	of	the	serial	outputs	of	the	simulation	
computer	to	send	simulated	radar	data	to	the	MCC.	The	radar	data	consist	of	the	simulation	of	a	
single	radar	site	within	the	WATR.	These	data	are	computed	in	the	simulation	from	the	latitude,	
longitude,	and	altitude	of	the	aircraft.	These	data	are	transmitted	out	of	the	simulation	via	a	serial	
(RS-232)	data	line,	with	an	output	rate	of	20	Hz	to	match	radar	processing	rates.
The	B-52	flight	profile	was	simulated	by	predefined	latitude,	longitude,	and	altitude	values	
for	the	aircraft	position	as	a	function	of	time.	This	permitted	simulations	from	aircraft	takeoff,	to	
the	launch	point,	and	to	a	landing	back	at	EAFB.	In	addition,	the	simulation	could	be	started	at	any	
point	in	this	flight	profile:	for	example,	to	focus	on	a	particular	phase	of	the	mission.
The	use	of	scenario-based	simulation	scripts	provided	the	flexibility	necessary	to	introduce	
simulated	 failures	 and	 events	 at	 arbitrary	 times.	 For	 example,	 a	 scenario	 script	 was	 used	 to	
accomplish	the	vehicle	pass/no-pass	built-in-test	(BIT)	of	the	HXRV	flight	management	unit	(FMU)	
for	flight-surface	actuation,	in	response	to	a	call	for	that	operation	from	the	mission	controller.	All	
9of	the	scenario-based	scripts	contain	predefined	sequences	of	operations	(usually	the	assigning	of	
vehicle	parameter	data	for	output	via	the	PCM	data	streams).	The	scripts	include	built-in	delays	
to	simulate	real	world	events.	Each	scenario	was	coded	into	a	single	script	with	a	corresponding	
reset	script.	Close	coordination	with	the	training	conductor	via	the	voice	network	was	required	to	
properly	execute	scripts	at	critical	times.
MISSION CONTROL CENTER ENVIRONMENT
The	MCCs	are	an	asset	in	the	WATR	at	DFRC.	Dedicated	lines	from	WATR	telemetry	and	
radar	equipment	provide	input	to	the	Telemetry/Radar	Acquisition	Processing	System	(TRAPS)	
facility,	which	processes	data	for	transmission	to	the	MCCs,	where	it	can	be	displayed	to	project	
engineers.	In	the	case	of	a	control	room	simulation	mission,	the	TRAPS	input	is	switched	to	use	
PCM	and	serial	radar	data	from	the	HXRV	simulation	environment	via	dedicated	fiber	lines	from	
the	RAIF.	Hyper-X	missions	for	vehicles	2	and	3	utilized	the	TRAPS	in	the	WATR	Integrated	Next	
Generation	System	(WINGS)	1.8	configuration.	Further	detail	on	the	WINGS	phased	development	
approach	can	be	found	in	ref.	5.	A	block	diagram	of	the	data	flow	between	the	aircraft,	TRAPS,	
and	MCC	is	shown	in	fig.	4.
Figure	4.		Data	flow	between	data	source,	TRAPS,	and	MCC.
The	 WINGS	 1.8	 system	 utilizes	 a	 Wyle	 Laboratories	 (El	 Segundo,	 California)	 Omega	
telemetry	front	end.	Calculations	on	telemetry	parameters	to	create	new	derived	parameters	are	
performed	using	two	in-house	software	applications	(one	running	at	rate	on	every	data	sample,	
and	a	second	legacy	program	running	on	a	subsample	of	the	data	set).	Derived	calculation	code	
was	incorporated	in	the	HXRV	simulation	so	that	the	desired	control	room	training	values	of	the	
derived	calculations	could	be	produced	in	the	simulation	environment.
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Within	the	WINGS	1.8	system,	all	PCM	and	radar	data	are	recorded	on	magnetic	analog	tape	
drives.	Data	are	also	recorded	in	digital	archive	format	so	that	the	data	can	be	converted	into	time	
history	data	and	stored	for	long-term	retrieval	on	DFRC	internal	flight	data	servers.
The	 MCCs	 in	 the	 WINGS	 1.8	 system	 offer	 a	 suite	 of	 in-house	 software	 programs	 for	
displaying	flight	data.	The	parameter	display	system	(PDS)	is	a	quickly	reconfigurable	software	
application	that	displays	parameter	values	from	a	current-value	table	(CVT).	Common	data	display	
types	in	PDS	include	numeric	readouts	of	parameter	values,	color	light	boxes	indicating	parameter	
state,	message	words	based	on	discrete	parameter	values,	bar	graphs,	and	time	history	displays.	A	
second	CVT-based	application,	Project	Application	Graphics	Executable	(PAGE),	is	utilized	when	
enhanced	graphic	display	capabilities	are	required.	For	the	X-43A	project,	PAGE	displays	included	
visualization	of	fluids	states	and	levels,	and	three-dimensional	sketches	of	the	HXRV	with	contour	
shading	to	represent	temperature	and	pressure	conditions	at	different	locations	on	the	vehicle.	If	
parameters	are	required	at	 rate	(not	sampled	 through	a	CVT),	 they	are	displayed	on	a	physical	
strip-chart	 in	 the	WINGS	1.8	MCC	configuration.	The	 two	MCCs	utilized	for	X-43A	missions	
contained	 a	 total	 of	 eighteen	 eight-channel	 strip-charts	 at	 engineer	workstations.	 For	Hyper-X	
missions,	a	total	of	51	PDS	displays	and	16	PAGE	control	room	displays	were	maintained	by	the	
WATR	and	viewed	by	project	personnel	during	missions.
In	addition	to	the	display	of	telemetry	and	derived	parameters,	the	WINGS	1.8	configuration	
provides	a	Global	Real-Time	Interactive	Map	(GRIM).	The	GRIM	utilizes	radar	and	aircraft	data	
to	display	the	location	of	an	aircraft	on	a	world	map.	Within	the	GRIM,	custom	restricted	areas	can	
be	predefined	on	the	world	map.	For	the	X-43A	project,	all	of	the	waypoints	were	entered	in	the	
GRIM	so	that	the	mission	controller	could	monitor	success	in	passing	each	waypoint	on	condition	
as	well	as	estimate	arrival	time	at	the	next	waypoint.	In	addition,	the	X-43A	launch	box	and	hazard	
debris	areas	over	the	Pacific	Ocean	were	displayed.	Range	safety	personnel	utilize	the	GRIM	to	
predict	areas	of	impact	in	the	event	of	FTS	activation.
The	X-43A	missions	also	employed	a	dedicated	in-house	application	called	the	Sim3DApp.	
This	program	received	a	broadcast	of	HXRV	parameters	from	a	server	application	running	on	the	
TRAPS	front	end.	The	Sim3DApp	uses	aircraft	data	to	display	a	three-dimensional	visual	image	
of	the	B-52	airplane,	HXLV,	and	HXRV	in	flight.	Because	of	the	high	speed	and	altitude	of	the	
HXRV	experiment,	optical	tracking	was	only	available	for	the	beginning	of	the	rocket	boost	phase.	
The	Sim3DApp	was	the	only	visualization	of	the	separation,	experiment,	and	descent	parameter	
identification	maneuvers	(PID)	available	for	the	X-43A	program.
The	MCCs	 at	 DFRC	 are	 equipped	 with	 over	 20	 stations	 running	 either	 PDS,	 PAGE,	 or	
GRIM.	Overhead	video	monitors	are	provided,	and	communications	panels	are	available	at	every	
workstation	to	provide	voice	networks	between	research	engineers,	the	mission	controller,	chief	
engineers,	pilots	and	operators	onboard	aircraft,	the	simulation	engineer	(in	a	training	situation),	
and	WATR	operations	personnel.
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CONTROL ROOM TRAINING SESSIONS
Everyone	who	 had	 a	 role	 in	 the	B-52	flight	 and	HXLV–HXRV	 stack	 launch	 participated	
in	X-43A	 control	 room	 training	 exercises:	 the	mission	 controller,	 the	HXRV	and	HXLV	chief	
engineers,	 the	 discipline	 engineers,	 the	 range	 control	 officer	 (RCO),	 the	 range	 safety	 officer	
(RSO),	 the	 test	 information	 engineer	 (TIE),	 the	WATR	 equipment	 operators,	 the	 B-52	 pilot,	
the	B-52	onboard	 launch	panel	 operator	 (LPO),	 and	 the	B-52	onboard	HXRV	station	operator	
(RV).	 Discipline	 engineers	 in	 the	 MCC	 included	 aerodynamics,	 flight	 systems,	 propulsion,	
instrumentation,	guidance,	navigation	and	control,	and	structures	personnel	for	the	HXRV,	as	well	
as	HXLV	development	and	integration	engineers.
Additionally,	two	other	people	were	necessary	for	the	control	room	training	exercises:		the	
simulation	engineer	and	the	training	conductor.	A	dedicated	voice	network	between	the	training	
conductor	 and	 the	 simulation	 engineer	was	 established	 to	 coordinate	 the	 execution	 of	 training	
scenarios.	No	one	else	in	the	room	could	hear	this	voice	communication,	so	there	was	an	element	
of	surprise	if	an	emergency	situation	was	introduced	by	the	training	conductor.
Prior	to	flight	1,	two	EP	training	sessions	were	conducted	using	the	technology	described	in	
ref.	3.	The	Hyper-X	solution	detailed	in	ref.	3	was	put	together	in	a	limited	timeframe	of	only	a	
few	months,	with	a	very	limited	budget.	The	simulation	capability	at	the	time	did	not	generate	a	
PCM	stream;	rather,	a	computer	in	the	TRAPS	generated	and	broadcast	over	Ethernet	directly	to	
the	PDS	and	PAGE	displays.	The	GRIM	and	strip-charts	in	the	control	room	could	not	be	used	
because	there	was	no	simulated	radar	stream	and	no	telemetry	counts	were	received	in	the	front	
end	 for	 conversion	 and	 display	 on	 strip-charts.	No	 data	 recordings	 or	 postflight	 data	 could	 be	
generated	from	this	method	of	control	room	training.	In	the	nearly	three-year	downtime	between	
flights	 1	 and	 2,	 the	DFRC	 simulation	 engineering	 branch	was	 able	 to	 procure	PCM	 simulator	
cards	and	develop	the	capability	to	send	a	simulated	PCM	stream	to	the	TRAPS	directly	from	the	
HXRV	 simulation	 environment.	The	 capabilities	 described	 herein	mark	 an	 improvement	 upon	
the	capability	for	flight	1:	engineers	are	now	able	to	view	simulated	strip-charts	and	GRIM	data,	
and	simulated	sessions	can	be	recorded	for	postflight	analysis.	 In	addition,	 the	simulated	PCM	
stream	allows	for	the	operation	of	the	Sim3DApp	for	flight	visualization.	As	a	side	benefit,	a	more	
complete	set	of	the	operational	equipment	is	utilized	by	this	new	method	so	it	can	be	verified	and	
personnel	can	gain	experience.
Prior	to	flight	2,	a	total	of	seven	control	room	training	sessions	were	held	using	the	HXRV	
simulation.	Between	flight	2	and	flight	3,	an	additional	six	control	room	training	sessions	were	
held.	Each	session	lasted	between	two	and	four	hours.	Each	session	began	with	a	nominal	B-52	
takeoff	 scenario.	After	 the	 simulated	 takeoff,	however,	 the	makeup	of	 the	 training	 session	was	
markedly	different,	depending	on	whether	the	training	had	been	designated	as	nominal	or	as	an	EP	
session.	Prior	to	each	EP	training	session,	the	training	conductor	and	mission	controller	identified	
training	goals	and	specific	team	training	topics.	The	actual	content	and	timing	of	the	emergency	
scripts	that	were	eventually	developed	for	each	EP	training	session,	however,	were	known	only	to	
the	training	conductor	and	the	simulation	engineer.	The	X-43	mission	controller	was	in	training	
himself,	and	was	not	forewarned	of	simulation	events,	as	everyone	else	on	the	team.
12
Within	each	EP	training	session,	a	progression	of	emergency	scripts	was	run	concurrent	with	
the	preprogrammed	nominal	 simulation.	The	script	would	 typically	change	specific	parameters	
and	eventually	time	out	with	one	parameter	or	more	in	excess	of	their	allowable	go/no-go	values.	
The	EP	 scenarios	were	 designed	 around,	 among	 other	 things,	 failed	 pressure	 sensors,	 a	 failed	
accelerometer,	leaking	valves,	a	hot	telemetry	transmitter,	oxygen	incursion	within	the	HXRV,	a	
fire	within	the	HXRV,	short-circuited	battery	systems,	failed	actuator	linkages,	and	a	structurally	
failed	pylon	hook.
The	discipline	engineers	responsible	for	monitoring	specific	parameters	would	react	to	the	
simulated	emergency	with	a	call	to	their	respective	lead	engineer.	If	the	lead	engineer	concurred,	
he	or	 she	would	 report	 the	 situation	and	 the	 suggested	EP	 to	 the	mission	controller	 for	 formal	
execution	of	 the	steps.	The	EPs	resulted	in	either	 the	continuation	of	 the	flight,	an	abort	of	 the	
drop	 and	 a	 recycle	 attempt,	 or	 a	mission	 abort	 and	 a	 return-to-base	 call	 to	 the	B-52	 airplane.	
After	meeting	this	final	condition,	the	simulation	would	be	paused	for	discussion	of	the	scenario.	
Typically,	a	single	EP	scenario,	from	the	start	of	the	script	to	the	pause	of	the	simulation,	could	
last	as	long	as	10	to	20	min.	It	was	not	uncommon,	particularly	if	the	EP	script	had	exposed	some	
procedure	deficiency	or	confusion	in	communication	protocol,	for	the	discussion	to	last	as	long	as	
the	EP	scenario	itself.
EXPERIENCE WITH CONTROL ROOM TRAINING SCENARIOS
To	make	the	best	use	of	the	control	room	training	time,	the	team	held	roundtable	discussions	
to	 learn	and	 refine	 the	mission	EPs.	The	 scenarios	were	designed	by	 the	 training	conductor	 to	
test	the	team	knowledge	of	the	EPs	and	go/no-go	lists.	An	example	of	a	typical	control	room	EP	
scenario	as	developed	by	the	training	conductor	is	shown	in	table	2.	Table	2	represents	the	way	
in	which	the	scenario	was	documented	to	the	simulation	engineer,	who	took	this	information	and	
generated	a	script	for	the	simulation	environment.	This	particular	scenario	involves	a	subtle,	and	
quite	unlikely,	failure	of	a	solid-state	accelerometer	within	the	FMU.	This	was	designed	specifically	
to	 train	the	controllers	 to	maintain	vigilance	on	the	less	obvious	failure	parameters.	The	layout	
of	table	2	shows	the	general	timing	used	during	a	typical	script.	It	also	illustrates	that	different	
parameters	were	altered	during	the	script	 to	simulate	some	real-world	change	as	a	result	of	 the	
specific	failure	being	simulated.
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Table	2.	Emergency	procedure	scenario	example.
Name Elapsed	
time,	
s
Increment	
delta	time,	
s
Parameter	
name
Off-
nominal	
value
Nominal
value
Parameter	
name
Comment Discipline	
observing
EP	#M3
(N
z
	
failure)
0 0 NZF -0.5 1.0	g FMU	
normal	
acceleration
 Systems,	
Aerodynamics,	
Controls,	
Mission	
controller
0 0 NZUF -0.5 1.0	g Unfiltered	
normal	
acceleration
0 0 HDOT -2000 0.0	fps Vertical	
velocity
0 0 INALT 40	000 40	000	ft Inertial	
altitude
2.5 2.5 INALT 37	500
5 2.5 INALT 35	000 <<	This	is	a	mission	rule	
violation
7.5 2.5 INALT 32	500
10 2.5 INALT 30	000
12.5 2.5 INALT 27	500
15 2.5 INALT 25	000
17.5 2.5 INALT 22	500
LBITOR: 1 0 Master	FMU	health	status	BIT
BIT	1709 1 0 FMU	HDOT	numeric	value	error
BIT	0602 1 0 FMU	accelerometer	oscillator	monitor	
failure
BIT	0601 1 0 FMU	accelerometer	temperature	sensor	
failure
BIT	0600 1 0 FMU	accelerometer	digitizer	saturation	
failure
20 2.5 “ 20	000
22.5 2.5 “ 17	500
25 2.5 “ 15	000
27.5 2.5 “ 12	500
30 2.5 “ 10	000
32.5 2.5 “ 7500
35 2.5 “ 5000
37.5 2.5 INALT 1000
42.5 5 End	script	with	NZF,	NZUF,	HDOT,	and	INALT	parameters	holding	last	
shown	off-nominal	values
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In	addition	to	standard	parameter	failures,	another	level	of	EP	scenario	was	introduced	that	
simulated	a	failure	that	did	not	technically	violate	the	go/no-go	procedures.	For	example,	in	the	
case	of	multiple	and	closely	related	sensors,	the	failure	of	one	out	of	the	set	was	permissible.	In	
one	scenario,	instead	of	simulating	an	oxygen	(O2)	incursion	within	the	HXRV	with	a	number	of	
different	O2	sensors	showing	over-limit	O2	percentages,	only	a	single	O2	sensor	was	shown	to	go	
over	the	mission	limit,	and	its	value	immediately	jumped	to	the	maximum	value.	While	the	initial	
urge	might	be	to	declare	an	emergency	due	to	oxygen	incursion,	the	correct	response	was	actually	
that	the	vehicle	had	a	single	bad	sensor	and	as	such	the	go/no-go	rules	were	not	violated.	Similar	
scenarios	were	designed	around	a	single	defective	fire	sensor	and	a	single	defective	temperature	
sensor.
Another	form	of	EP	scenario	focused	on	exploring	subtle	aspects	of	 the	official	EPs.	One	
major	safety	concern	was	the	health	of	the	pylon	holding	the	X-43A	stack	onto	the	wing	of	the	
B-52	airplane.	 If	 there	was	an	unsafe	 condition	over	 land,	 the	procedures	 called	 for	 a	mission	
abort	and	jettison	of	 the	pylon	(with	the	X-43A	stack	still	attached)	 in	a	remote	desert	area.	In	
the	scenario	concerning	this	mission	rule,	the	B-52	onboard	HXRV	station	operator	was	told	to	
report	that	he	had	indication	of	“two	pylon	lights	on.”	These	lights	are	not	monitored	on	ground	
displays,	and	indicated	a	serious	problem	within	the	pylon.	This	emergency	was	simulated	at	the	
L-5-min	point,	during	an	extremely	busy	time	onboard	the	B-52	airplane	and	in	the	MCC.	The	
immediate	reaction	in	the	MCC	was	to	abort	the	drop	and	begin	preparation	for	the	B-52	crew	to	
jettison	the	stack.	However,	since	the	call	was	made	while	the	flight	was	over	the	Sea	Range,	the	
correct	procedure	for	this	case	was	to	continue	with	the	nominal	drop	mission	and	to	jettison	the	
pylon	sometime	after	the	drop.	When	this	same	scenario	was	repeated	at	a	later	session	the	mission	
controller	correctly	acknowledged	the	issue,	and	proceeded	with	the	nominal	predrop	procedures.
One	EP	scenario	resulted	in	a	considerable	amount	of	postscenario	discussion.	It	involved	a	
script	that	had	the	S-band	telemetry	transmitter	temperature	increase	significantly,	but	never	exceed	
the	maximum	allowed	limit	of	180	°F.	Then	it	cooled	down	and	randomly	fluctuated	to	represent	a	
noisy	signal,	right	around	the	parameter	go/no-go	value	of	140	°F.	This	scenario	was	run	at	about	
the	L-8-min	point	and	resulted	in	the	responsible	engineer	aborting	the	flight.	The	key,	however,	
was	 that	 the	 script	 terminated	 with	 the	 transmitter	 temperature	 static	 at	 139	 °F,	 an	 allowable	
temperature	according	to	the	mission	go/no-go	rules.	Although	no	one	could	dispute	the	engineer’s	
decision,	the	scenario	created	considerable	discussion	about	the	“what-ifs”	of	this	situation.	Many	
thought	it	more	hazardous	to	the	mission	to	be	needlessly	overcautious	and	return	to	EAFB	for	
a	 later	attempt,	 rather	 than	continue	 the	flight	with	a	 tolerable	 (according	 to	 the	mission	 rules)	
instrument	problem.	Although	this	particular	scenario	does	not	have	a	straightforward	solution,	it	
benefited	the	team	by	exposing	personnel	to	a	possible	scenario,	creating	an	opportunity	for	them	
to	evaluate	their	response	to	this	situation.	
As	mentioned	 earlier,	 the	 L-9-min	 period	was	 the	most	 critical	 for	 executing	 the	HXRV	
launch,	so	all	training	sessions	typically	included	repeated	L-9-min	runs	to	get	the	entire	team	not	
only	complying	with	the	required	pace	but	actually	improving	the	clarity	of	their	communication	
and	getting	comfortable	with	the	critical	procedural	 timing.	Of	course,	 these	L-9-min	runs	also	
provided	a	prime	opportunity	for	the	training	conductor	to	implement	EP	scenarios	to	enhance	the	
stress	on	the	team,	and	to	challenge	their	compliance	with	communications	protocols	during	this	
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communications-heavy	period.	One	particularly	challenging	EP	scenario,	initiated	by	the	training	
conductor	at	L-3	min,	presented	an	intentional	decrease	in	instrument	battery	voltage	combined	
with	an	 increase	 in	S-band	 transmitter	 temperature.	Neither	of	 these	scenarios	was	 intended	 to	
cause	initiation	of	an	EP;	rather,	they	served	as	a	distraction	for	the	already	busy	flight	systems	
team.	The	actual	emergency	situation	was	 the	 intermittent	change	 in	a	critical	 status	word	 that	
relates	to	the	activation	of	the	valves	onboard	the	HXRV.	This	situation	occurred	at	L-20	s	and	
required	a	mission	abort	call	from	the	lead	flight	systems	engineer,	which	was	correctly	handled	in	
the	training	session.	Scenarios	such	as	this	helped	the	personnel	stay	focused	and	perceptive,	and	
to	communicate	with	clarity	in	the	face	of	a	highly	stressful	situation	such	as	they	might	face	on	
the	actual	day	of	the	flight.
Other	EP	 scenarios	were	 specially	designed	 to	 simulate	unusual	 failures	within	 the	MCC	
infrastructure.	 These	 non-software-driven	 failures	 forced	 the	 team,	 and	 particularly	 the	 lead	
discipline	engineers	and	the	mission	controller,	to	experience	the	situation	live	and	later	discuss	the	
best	methods	to	resolve	the	situation.	For	example,	the	intermittent	loss	of	the	telemetry	link	from	
the	B-52	airplane	or	the	X-43A	was	simulated	with	a	technician	literally	pulling	and	reinserting	the	
main	PCM	data	input	cable	that	was	used	to	ultimately	drive	the	displays	in	the	control	room.	In	
one	scenario,	the	electronics	box	controlling	audio	communications	to	a	lead	engineer	was	totally	
disabled.	In	another	case,	a	lead	engineer’s	key	graphic	display	was	shut	down.	To	accentuate	the	
stress,	and	simulate	a	worst-case	event,	each	of	these	latter	two	events	were	performed	with	no	
forewarning	and	were	timed	to	occur	just	prior	to	that	key	individual’s	team	experiencing	an	EP	
scenario	that	was	specifically	focused	on	their	discipline.
An	interesting	training	phenomenon	was	noticed	by	the	training	conductor	near	the	end	of	
the	training	for	flight	2.	When	the	final	training	session	was	announced	as	a	nominal	session	it	
was	 noted	 that	 several	members	 of	 the	mission	 control	 team	 seemed	 to	 be	 complacent	 –	 they	
didn’t	bring	 their	EP	books	 to	 the	MCC.	Clearly	 there	was	zero	expectation	of	any	emergency	
events	during	 the	nominal	 training.	Could	 this	 expectation	affect	 training,	 and	ultimately	 team	
performance?	
The	answer	 to	 this	question	was	yes,	as	quickly	demonstrated	by	an	 improvised	 test	near	
the	end	of	 that	 session.	The	 training	conductor	unexpectedly	 inserted	an	emergency	script	 that	
simulated	a	no-go	increase	in	S-band	transmitter	temperature	just	prior	to	the	“nominal”	launch.	
Neither	the	responsible	engineer	monitoring	that	display	nor	the	chief	engineer	also	overseeing	the	
same	data	reported	the	anomaly,	and	instead	allowed	the	mission	controller	to	proceed	with	the	
launch.	During	post-session	discussions	they	both	stated	that	they	did	indeed	see	the	no-go	data	but	
regarded	it	as	a	computer	simulation	anomaly	because	“this	was	a	nominal	training.”	
The	 training	 received	during	 the	 nominal	 and	 emergency	 training	 sessions	was	 excellent.	
But	 this	 “nominal”	 conduct	 during	 a	 session	with	 “nominal”	 expectations,	 in	 the	 face	 of	 data	
to	the	contrary,	seemed	somewhat	counter-productive	to	the	goal	of	training.	As	a	result,	it	was	
recommended	and	implemented	that	all	future	sessions	be	announced	as	simply	mission	training	
sessions.	Except	for	the	mission	controller,	who	aided	the	training	conductor	with	the	determination	
and	prioritization	of	 training	 issues	 and	goals	 for	 each	 session,	 the	 team	wouldn’t	know	 if	 the	
training	session	was	an	EP	or	a	nominal	session.	The	result	of	this	slight	change	to	the	training	
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was	clearly	demonstrated	just	prior	to	flight	3	during	a	full	nonstop	90-min	(and	therefore	assumed	
nominal)	training	session.	At	L-1	min	(with	no	foreknowledge	to	anyone	in	the	MCC)	a	go/no-go	
battery	issue	was	simulated	and	the	flight	systems	lead	engineer	immediately	called	the	emergency	
and	an	abort,	and	the	entire	team	responded	with	the	appropriate	emergency	procedural	call-outs.	
It	was	an	excellent	rehearsal	and	demonstrated	that	the	team	was	ready	for	flight.
CONTROL ROOM TRAINING BENEFIT
The	Hyper-X	project	personnel	reaped	numerous	benefits	from	the	extensive	control	room	
training	sessions	that	were	conducted	prior	to	flights	2	and	3.	The	infrequent	flights	and	months	of	
downtime	between	missions	made	control	room	training	essential	to	providing	the	project	personnel	
with	 recent	 experience	 and	 familiarity	with	 the	 control	 center.	 Everyone	 participating	 became	
more	familiar	with	the	pace	of	operations	and	the	time	allotted	for	each	step	in	the	flight	cards.	
Inexperienced	personnel	used	training	to	get	accustomed	to	the	monotony	of	monitoring	virtually	
static	displays	for	over	an	hour	as	the	B-52	airplane	flew	offshore	to	the	drop	point.	Development	
of	crew	discipline	and	focus	was	noticeable	as	multiple	training	sessions	were	conducted.	Unlike	
the	major	portion	of	the	B-52	flight,	the	final	9	min	immediately	preceding	the	drop	event	were	
communication-	and	action-intensive.	This	L-9-min	portion	of	the	flight	was	rehearsed	repeatedly	
in	both	the	nominal	and	the	EP	training	sessions.	In	some	cases,	the	practice	revealed	areas	where	
a	reassessment	of	the	timing	or	execution	of	steps	was	required,	and	the	flight	cards	were	fine-
tuned.	Revisions	of	the	flight	cards	were	produced	between	each	of	the	early	control	room	training	
sessions	as	lessons	learned	from	the	exercise	were	incorporated	into	the	cards.
In	addition	to	fine-tuning	the	flight	cards,	project	personnel	were	able	to	refine	the	go/no-go	
list	and	the	EP	checklists	based	on	the	control	room	training	sessions.	When	the	training	conductor	
triggered	a	return-to-base	call	based	on	specific	parameter	temperature	or	pressure	limits	from	the	
go/no-go	list,	in	many	cases	a	lengthy	discussion	on	the	true	hard	limit	for	that	parameter	would	
occur,	and	the	project	was	able	to	perfect	the	allowable	ranges	of	mission	parameter	values.	It	would	
be	unacceptable	for	a	debate	on	a	mission	parameter	limit	to	take	place	during	an	actual	mission;	
repeated	testing	of	the	limits	in	a	training	session	allowed	for	preflight	debate	and	discussion	on	
appropriate	mission	parameter	limits.	Also,	in	one	training	session,	a	pressure	over-limit	call	to	
vent	the	onboard	systems	was	initiated	by	someone	outside	the	propulsion	group	based	on	a	review	
and	misinterpretation	of	the	data	values	displayed.	This	prompted	a	discussion	by	the	group,	and	
as	a	result,	the	Hyper-X	team	redefined	the	allowable	initiators	of	EPs	based	on	this	experience	
in	the	training	environment.	Crew	members	also	identified	a	need	to	speak	succinctly	and	present	
information	to	the	mission	controller	in	a	standard	order	every	time,	so	an	abbreviated	language	
about	EPs	was	born	out	of	the	practice	in	the	control	room	training	sessions.	Repeated	emergency	
scenarios	in	the	final	L-9-min	commotion	helped	the	personnel	practice	staying	focused,	perceptive,	
and	clearheaded	in	the	face	of	highly	stressful	situations.
The	control	room	training	exercises	utilizing	the	simulation	also	allowed	for	verification	of	
the	calibration	information	contained	in	the	Calibration	Information	Management	System	(CIMS)	
file.	When	the	simulation	was	used	to	reverse-engineer	a	counts	value	for	a	desired	engineering	
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unit	(EU)	value,	the	displayed	value	in	the	WATR	could	be	used	to	test	whether	the	calibration	
information	was	valid	and	functional.
While	the	flight	and	control	room	crews	benefited	from	the	training	sessions,	WATR	personnel	
involved	were	also	receiving	valuable	practice	and	testing	opportunities.	Range	operations	personnel	
became	familiar	with	the	setup	and	execution	of	Hyper-X	missions,	because	without	these	simulated	
sessions,	there	would	have	been	few	opportunities	to	practice	configuring	the	control	room	for	end	
users.	The	TIE	was	able	to	test	all	67	control	room	displays,	the	derived	calculation	code,	and	strip-
charts	with	the	simulated	PCM	stream.	Engineers	could	see	their	displays	“in	action”	rather	than	
in	a	static	testing	mode,	and	that	triggered	many	modifications	to	the	way	data	were	calculated	and	
displayed	to	the	end	user.	In	the	early	development	of	the	capability,	the	ability	to	record	sessions	
and	generate	postsession	time-history	data	files	proved	valuable	to	the	training	conductor,	TIE,	and	
simulation	engineer	for	testing	and	verifying	the	control	room	training	scenarios.	Finally,	using	a	
simulated	PCM	stream	was	the	only	means	of	verifying	the	Sim3DApp	used	for	visualization	of	
stack	ascent,	separation	event,	HXRV	experiment,	and	HXRV	descent	into	the	ocean.
CONCLUSION
The	capability	to	simulate	multiple	telemetry	streams	and	radar	data	in	order	to	train	flight	
and	mission	control	personnel	 for	a	flight	project	at	 the	NASA	Dryden	Flight	Research	Center	
has	been	successfully	demonstrated.	This	 technology	was	used	 to	simulate	 in-flight	emergency	
scenarios	for	the	Hyper-X	program	and	provide	a	means	for	the	crew	to	practice	several	mission	
profiles.
These	training	sessions:
•	 Improved	crew	response	and	communications
•	 Verified	and	improved	control	room	displays
•	 Verified	calibration	coefficients
•	 Verified	operational	equipment
•	 Improved	checklists	and	go/no-go	limits
•	 Resulted	in	a	safer	mission.
Crew	training	via	simulated	in-flight	scenarios	in	the	Dryden	Mission	Control	Centers	was	an	
essential	part	of	the	preparation	for	Hyper-X	research	missions.	Control	room	training	was	a	cost-
effective	means	of	ensuring	both	flight	safety	and	mission	success	for	the	Hyper-X	air	launches.	As	
both	the	crew	and	the	simulation	training	team	gained	familiarity	with	the	capabilities	of	the	system,	
the	fidelity	of	the	training	sessions	was	improved	and	project	personnel	were	able	to	perfect	their	
data	displays,	go/no-go	launch	conditions,	emergency	procedures,	and	the	flight	cards.	The	control	
room	training	environment	served	as	a	nonthreatening	place	for	personnel	to	learn	their	roles	and	
practice	responding	efficiently	 to	highly	stressful	simulated	emergency	scenarios.	According	 to	
Dryden	Hyper-X	chief	engineer	Griffin	Corpening,	“this	hard	work	and	training	paid	off	(in	the	
form	of)	three	flawless	captive-carry	flights	and	three	flawless	launch	operations.”
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